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Will the U.S. Sentencing Commission's New
Proposed Guidelines for Crimes by Organizations
Provide an Effective Deterrent for Crimes
Attributed to Corporations? (Or Will The New
Proposed Guidelines Put an Exclamation Point in
the Sentence for Corporate Crime?)
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Sentencing Commission1 has proposed amendments2 to
its guidelines, policy statements and accompanying commentary
that would now govern the sentencing of organizations, including
corporations, in federal courts. In general, corporations convicted
of federal crimes would face substantially larger fines, significant
restitutionary requirements," and potential intervention in corpo-
rate management and financial operations under the proposed or-
ganizational probation provisions.'
The proposed amendments (hereinafter "Proposed Guidelines")
could become effective as early as this year (during 1991), although
not necessarily in their present form." Other federal sentencing
1. The U.S. Sentencing Commission is an independent agency of the judicial branch
of the U.S. Government empowered to promulgate sentencing guidelines and policy state-
ments for federal courts. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 28 USC § 994(a) (1988). The Sen-
tencing Reform Act requires that the sentencing court select a sentence from within the
guideline range; however, if a particular case presents atypical features, the court may de-
part from the guidelines and sentence outside the prescribed range. 18 USC § 3553(b)
(1988); see also, Fed Sent Guide Man 1 (West, 1991).
2. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts; Notice of Proposed Additions to
Sentencing Guidelines, Policy Statements and Commentary; Request for Public Comment,
54 Fed Reg 47056 (1989).
3. Thompson, Corporations Face Stiffer Sentencing, Wash Post B4, col 1 (Nov 8,
1989) (quoting I. Nagel, one of the U.S. Sentencing Commission's 6 members).
4. 54 Fed Reg, Part B at 47057 (cited in note 2).
5. Id, Parts B and C at 47057 and 47062.
6. Telephone interviews with Paul K. Martin, Communications Director of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission (Aug 8 and 21, 1990 and Feb 20, 1991). Substantial public comment
has been received on the Proposed Guidelines. Id. The Sentencing Commission has reviewed
the comments which they received and is considering submitting the Proposed Guidelines,
possibly with some revisions, to the U.S. Congress by May 1, 1991. If submitted by May 1,
1991, the Proposed Guidelines will automatically become effective on November 1, 1991,
provided Congress takes no contrary action regarding them and provided the Sentencing
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guidelines for individuals and corporate antitrust offenders became
effective in November, 1987 and were recently amended in Novem-
ber, 1990.'
The Proposed Guidelines would apply in federal criminal cases
where the convicted defendant is an organization,' rather than an
individual." The objectives of sentencing for organizations are
identical to those currently for individuals. 10 Accordingly, the Pro-
posed Guidelines recognize that the desirable objectives of making
restitution available to victims, deterring future criminal conduct
and ensuring enforcement of sanctions" may also be achieved in
the sentencing of corporate defendants.
The focus of this comment is to examine whether the Proposed
Guidelines will provide an effective deterrent to crimes attributed
to corporations. More specifically, this comment will address the
following questions: (1) is current sentencing of corporate defend-
ants too lenient?; (2) will courts impose the enhanced, but non-
mandatory, probation conditions in the Proposed Guidelines which
are intended to ensure that a transgressor company will compen-
sate society?; (3) will the Proposed Guidelines force socially re-
sponsible companies to pay for the criminal conduct of errant em-
ployees?; (4) will the Proposed Guidelines give rise to excessive
sentences that will unfairly drive corporate businesses into bank-
ruptcy?; and (5) will the Proposed Guidelines provide an adequate
incentive for corporations to implement self-policing? In other
words, this comment addresses whether the Proposed Guidelines
add an exclamation point to the sentence for corporate crime.
This comment endeavors to distill much of the current 12 pub-
lished commentary and background materials regarding the Pro-
posed Guidelines, the salient portions of the text of the Proposed
Guidelines, and certain relevant judicial decisions. At the end of
this comment, the author's conclusions and recommendations are
Commission does not withdraw them before that date. Id. See also, 28 USC § 994 (1988),
which states that Sentencing Guideline amendments automatically take effect 180 days after
submission, unless a law is enacted to the contrary.
7. Interviews with Director Martin. For the current text of the Sentencing Guide-
lines, Commentary, and Policy Statements of the United States Sentencing Commission, as
most recently amended, November 1, 1990, see Fed Sent Guide Man (cited in note 1).
8. "Organization" is defined as "a person other than an individual." 18 USC § 18
(1988). This definition includes: corporations, unions, associations and partnerships. 54 Fed
Reg at 47057 (cited in note 2).
9. Id at 47056.
10. Id. See also, 18 USC § 3553(a)(2) (1988).
11. 54 Fed Reg at 47056 (cited in note 2).





A. Is Current Sentencing of Corporate Defendants Too Lenient?
According to the Chairman of the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
Judge Wilkins,' 3 both the Commission and U.S. Congress generally
believe that, historically, fines have been too low to deter crimes
attributed to corporations. 14 Judge Wilkins has stated that federal
judges currently have unbridled authority to impose a wide range
of penalties for any given offense.' 5 Consequently, according to
Judge Wilkins, fines are often too low to prompt corporations to
implement self-policing policies.' 6 Empirical data, as reported by
the U.S. Justice Department, indicate that during 1975 and 1976,
over 60 percent of the nation's largest corporations had at least one
enforcement action initiated against them, and that over 40 per-
cent of the manufacturing corporations engaged in repeated crimi-
nal violations.' 7 The U.S. Department of Defense reported that
since 1983, 20 of the largest 100 defense contractors have been con-
victed in criminal cases.'" Furthermore, the Resolution Trust Cor-
poration'" reported that during 1989, fraud was discovered in 60
percent of the savings and loans seized by the U.S. government.2 0
Nevertheless, the number of organizations convicted and sen-
tenced in the federal courts over the last few years was relatively
small2' compared to the number of individuals, 22 while the costs,
both socially and financially, of corporate crimes were immense.23
13. Honorable Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr., Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
14. Aaron Epstein, Panel to Toughen Punishment for Corporate Crime, Pittsburgh
Press, BI, B2, col 1 (Apr 8, 1990).
15. Epstein, Pittsburgh Press at B1, col 2 (cited in note 14).
16. Id.
17. Amitai Etzioni, Getting Down to Business on Corporate Crime, Legal Times at
21, col 1 (May 21, 1990).
18. Etzioni, Legal Times at 21, col 1 (cited in note 17).
19. The Resolution Trust Corporation was established by the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 to manage the U.S. savings and loan
bailout.
20. Etzioni, Legal Times at 21, col 1 (cited in note 17).
21. Approximately 350 companies per year were convicted and sentenced. 54 Fed Reg
at 47056 (cited in note 2).
22. Id.
23. Epstein, Pittsburgh Press at B1, col 1 (cited in note 14). According to Mr. Ep-
stein, these immense costs include massive saving-and-loan scandals; criminal insider trad-
ing on Wall Street; pervasive frauds in defense contracts; unsafe foods, drugs and other
products; unsafe working conditions; costly oil spills; and dumping of toxic wastes. Id.
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Unfortunately, except for one guideline addressing fines for anti-
trust violations, the federal sentencing guidelines currently in ef-
fect do not govern the sentencing of corporations.2
Historically, when coiporations were convicted, the punishment
rarely suited the crime.25 For example, when General Electric was
convicted of price-fixing in the early 1960s, the corporation was
fined approximately $450,000, which a former federal prosecutor
characterized as "a three dollar ticket for overtime parking for a
man with a $15,000 income. '2 6 Similarly, the fines imposed on 60
banks convicted of money-laundering since 1982 were so small that
the convicted corporations could easily absorb the fines as part of
the cost of doing business.2 7 In fact, in several cases top corporate
executives have directed their employees to systematically violate
criminal laws.28
Prior to 1984, statutes often made it impossible for courts to im-
pose large, and thus meaningful, fines upon convicted corpora-
tions.29 Consequently, prosecutors have been relegated to charging
executives rather than the corporations because they could not ob-
tain significant sentences against the companies. 30 In fact, accord-
ing to the U.S. Sentencing Commission staff, the average fine im-
posed in all corporate cases between 1984 and 1987 was
approximately $48,000.1 Moreover, 67 percent of the penalties
during this period were $10,000 or less.
3 2
The sizes of fines, in terms of dollars, that federal courts could
impose were dramatically increased by the Criminal Fine Enforce-
ment Act of 1984.33 In addition, penalties were subsequently in-
creased by Congress for a variety of crimes committed by individu-
24. 54 Fed Reg at 47056 (cited in note 2).
25. Russell Mokhiber, Greedy Corporations: Criminals by Any Other Name, Los An-
geles Daily J 4, col 5 (Feb 28, 1986).
26. Mokhiber, Los Angeles Daily J at 4, col 5 (cited in note 25).
27. Etzioni, Legal Times at 21, col 1 (cited in note 17).
28. Id. "For example, the shenanigans at General Dynamics that cost the [U.S.] De-
fense Department hundreds of millions of dollars in the 1970s were orchestrated by its chief
executive officer. At Beech-Nut, top management oversaw the systematic adulteration of
apple juice sold to infants." Id.
29. 54 Fed Reg at 47057 (cited in note 2).
30. Etzioni, Legal Times at 21, col 1 (cited in note 17).
31. Barbara Franklin, Punishing Corporations, High Fines, Probation Suggested in
Proposed Guidelines, NY L J 5, col 2 (Dec 7, 1989) (data from a study prepared for the U.S.
Sentencing Commission by M. Cohen, Assistant Professor of Management at Vanderbilt
University).
32. Franklin, NY L J at 5, col 2 (cited in note 31).
33. 54 Fed Reg at 47057 (cited in note 2). See also, Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of
1984, Pub L No 95-596, 98 Stat 3134 (1984).
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als in organizations, or the organizations themselves.3 4 According
to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the average fine imposed in all
corporate cases during 1988 rose to approximately $195,000. a" Fur-
thermore, only 45 percent of the fines were less than $10,000.36
Traditionally, courts and legislatures have proceeded under the
assumption that a corporation could not be incarcerated.37 This is
clear from the case law and legislative history under the sentencing
statutes. However, such case law fails to cite any modern authority
for such a proposition .3  Recognizing this juristic inconsistency,
some federal judges have imposed probation on corporate defend-
ants as a type of incarceration .3  For example, in U.S. v Mitsubishi
International Corp.,10 the court required the defendant corpora-
tion to lend the services of an executive to a charitable organiza-
tion for one year to develop an ex-offenders program. In U.S. v
Danilow Pastry Co.,"1 the court required the defendant bakery
companies to donate bread to organizations for the needy. These
34. 54 Fed Reg at 47057 (cite in note 2). For example, penalties were increased for
crimes such as money laundering, major fraud and insider trading. See Money Laundering
Control Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-570, subtitle H, 100 Stat 3218-35 (1986); Major Fraud Act
of 1988, Publ L No 100-700, 102 Stat 4631 (1988); and Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-704, 102 Stat 4677 (1988).
35. Franklin, NY L J at 5, col 2 (cited in note 31).
36. Id.
37. Terry Carter, How to Sentence a Corporation?, Nat L J 3, col 1 (Sep 26, 1988).
38. U.S. v Allegheny Bottling Company, 695 F Supp 856, 861 (E D Va 1988), see
note 43. For some other examples, see U.S. v Union Supply Co., 215 US 50, 55 (1909) and
U.S. v Interstate Cigar Co., 801 F2d 555, 556 (1st Cir 1986). "
39. John Coffee, Corporate Probation Needed as Sentencing Tool, NJ L J 9, 10, col 1
(Mar 1, 1990). See also, notes 40, 41 and 43.
40. 677 F2d 785 (9th Cir 1982). Defendant corporations were indicted for numerous
violations of the Elkins Act (49 USC §§ 11903 and 11915 ( )), including violations of railroad
freight tariffs that resulted in favorable treatment for Mitsubishi. The district court sen-
tenced each defendant corporation to the maximum fine of $20,000 on each count; however,
upon the condition that the minimum fine of $1,000 be paid on each count, the balance of
the fine was suspended and each corporation was placed on three years probation. Defend-
ants appealed and challenged the legality of the sentence and the conditions of probation;
the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.
Mitsubishi, 677 F2d at 786.
41. 563 F Supp 1159 (S D NY 1983). Six defendant wholesale bakery corporations
were sentenced together with six individual defendants. All pleaded nolo contendere to rais-
ing and fixing prices and engaging in a continuing combination and conspiracy in unreason-
able restraint of interstate trade and commerce in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 USC § 1
(1980); the district court imposed fines, suspended execution of jail terms, placed the de-
fendants on probation, and ordered five of the six individuals and all of the corporations to
perform community service as a condition of probation; the court ordered the corporate
defendants to donate specified amounts of their pastry products to needy organizations,
which organizations were to be designated in a subsequent order. Danilow Pastry, 563 F
Supp at 1163.
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types of sentences have been criticized, however, as too novel, as
exceeding judicial power, or as converting the courts into charita-
ble foundations.42
In U.S. v Allegheny Bottling Co.,"3 the court concluded that it
would treat a corporation no less severely than it would any indi-
vidual who similarly disregarded the law." Contrary to the tradi-
tional view at the time, the Allegheny court held that a corpora-
tion can be imprisoned."' Furthermore, .the court determined that,
definitionally, imprisonment requires only that the corporation be
restrained or immobilized."
The Allegheny court sentenced one company to prison, sus-
pended the sentence, placed it on probation and ordered it to com-
mit four high-salaried officials to two years of community service.
Judge Doumar, who rendered the court's opinion, told Allegheny
Bottling Company's lawyers that he imposed the sentence because
the maximum $1 million fine he levied would likely be viewed by
the corporation as simply a cost of doing business."7 Although the
probation sentence was subsequently overturned, Judge Doumar
commented that public reaction to this sentence indicated that
many people felt that corporate sentencing had been inadequate,
and that he thought that the Allegheny view might someday be-
come the law.'8
The Proposed Guidelines provide a significant additional step in
this direction. The U.S. Sentencing Commission has set forth two
options (hereinafter "Options I and II") for consideration in ad-
dressing fines.4 Option I bases the range of fines on the greater of
(1) the loss, (2) the gain, or (3) a specified amount relating to the
42. Coffee, NJ L J at 18, col 1 (cited in note 39). In other words, courts were prone
toward the use of unbridled judicial discretion in creative attempts to impose novel sanc-
tions. Id at 9, col 1.
43. 695 F Supp 856 (E D Va 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 870 F2d 655 (4th Cir
1989), afl'd, 870 F2d 656 (4th Cir 1989), cert denied, 110 S Ct 68 (1989). Defendant soft
drink bottling corporation was sentenced for engaging in a price-fixing conspiracy which
violated the Sherman Act, 15 USC § 1 (1984); the corporation was sentenced to three years
imprisonment and a fine of $1 million; execution of that sentence of imprisonment was sus-
"pended, and all but $950,000 of the fine was suspended; the defendant was placed on proba-
tion for a period of three years; as a special condition of the probation, four high-salaried
officials were required to render two years of community service. Allegheny, 695 F Supp at
857-59.
44. Id at 858.
45. Id at 859.
46. Id at 861.
47: Carter, Natl L J at 4, col 1 (cited in note 37).
48. Epstein, Pittsburgh Press at B7, col 6 (cited in note 14).
49. 54 Fed Reg at 47058 (cited in note 2).
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offense level, with adjustments based upon aggravating or mitigat-
ing factors as set forth in the Proposed Guidelines.50 Option II ba-
ses the fine range entirely upon the offense level, also with adjust-
ments based upon aggravating or mitigating factors as set forth in
the Proposed Guidelines." For the first time, the amount of fines
will generally correlate with the amount of harm done by the com-
pany.2 Consequently, past practice may not necessarily reflect the
rule in present and future practice."
Historically, sentencing may have been too lenient to provide an
effective deterrent to crimes committed by corporations. However,
recent court decisions, recent federal legislation and the Proposed
Guidelines indicate that the trend is changing; future criminal con-
duct on the part of corporations may well lead to increasingly stern
sentencing.
B. Will Courts Impose the Enhanced, But Non-Mandatory, Pro-
bation Conditions in the Proposed Guildlines Which Are In-
tended to Ensure That a Transgressor Company Will Compen-
sate Society?
The Proposed Guidelines set forth the circumstances when cor-
porate probation is authorized as a substantive sanction or as a
means to enforce another sanction, such as a fine or a form of resti-
tution. 4 Probation is mandatory if, at the time of sentencing, the
corporation has not completely paid its monetary penalties and
restitution.5 If necessary, probation is also required for enforce-
ment of restitution, a remedial order, or community service.5
Furthermore, the Proposed Guidelines mandate probation for
preventive purposes where (1) the corporation or a high-level man-
agement member has been convicted for a similar offense within
the past five years; (2) the court concludes that the offense indi-
cates a significant problem with the corporation's policies for
prev.nting crime; or (3) the court concludes that "probation will
significantly increase the likelihood of future compliance with the
50. Id.
51. Id at 47059.
52. Tracy Thompson, Corporations Face Stiffer Sentencing, Wash Post B1, col 5, at
B4, col 3 (Nov 8, 1989).
53. 54 Fed Reg at 47057 (cited in note 2).





law."57 The court may only impose conditions that are reasonably
related to the nature of the offense and are necessary to achieve
the court's purpose.5 8
When corporations are placed on probation because they did not
fully pay their fine, restitution, or special assessment by the time
of sentencing, the Proposed Guidelines recommend (but do not re-
quire) that the court impose certain enhanced conditions (herein-
after "Enhanced Conditions") to secure the defendant's obligation
to pay.5 9 These recommended Enhanced Conditions include the
following: (1) requiring the corporation to submit to regular and
unannounced audits and to the interrogation of knowledgeable em-
ployees; (2) prohibiting the corporation from paying any distribu-
tions to any equity holders, such as dividends, without prior court
approval; (3) prohibiting the corporation, without court approval,
from issuing new equity or debt securities, or obtaining additional
financing outside the ordinary course of business; and (4) prohibit-
ing any merger, consolidation, refinancing, liquidation, bankruptcy
or other major transaction, without court approval.6 0
Federal judges have found that probation is generally unwork-
able as a sanction for corporate defendants, although suitable for
individual defendants. 1 Courts rarely have imposed probation and
have only used it to maintain noninterventionist jurisdiction over a
matter until all fines were paid by the corporation.2 In fact, the
incidence of probation sentences has been approximately 18 per-
cent for convicted organizations for the period 1984 through
1987.63 This period includes enactment of the Criminal Fine En-
forcement Act of 198464 and substantial additional crime enforce-
ment legislation pertaining to individuals in organizations. 5
According to the National Association of Manufacturers (herein-
after "NAM"), imposing the recommended Enhanced Conditions,
i.e., placing corporations on probation for failing to pay their mon-
57. Id.
58. Id at § 8D1.3(b), 47062.
59. Id at § 8D1.3(c), 47062.
60. Id.
61. Victoria Toensing, Corporations on Probation: Sentenced to Fail, NJ L J 7, col 1
(Feb 22, 1990).
62. Toensing, NJ L J at 7, col 1 (cited in note 61).
63. Mark A. Cohen, Organizations as Defendants in Federal Court: A Preliminary
Analysis of Prosecutions, Convictions, and Sanctions, 10 Whittier L Rev 103, 139, n.5
(1988).
64. See note 33.
65. See note 33.
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etary fines at the time of sentencing, would be the equivalent of
having the courts run the commercial enterprise." NAM is espe-
cially concerned that the courts will delve into the traditional com-
pany decision-making provinces pertaining to dividend payments,
financing, and mergers and acquisitions. 7
Under the Proposed Guidelines, a convicted corporation should,
as a first priority, be forced to make restitution to identifiable vic-
tims of its criminal conduct.18 A corporation may be ordered to
perform community service and provide an expeditious way of re-
pairing the harm caused by the offense. 9 The federal courts are
divided as to whether a court may.order a convicted corporation to
engage in mandatory community service or to pay community res-
titution70 as a condition of probation.71
Apparently, for large corporate violators the Proposed Guide-
lines tend to rely on probation sentences. Nevertheless, the Pro-
posed Guidelines do not provide any guidance for a court to deter-
mine whether a company should pay dividends, issue new debt, or
enter into a merger. They merely recommend that a defendant cor-
poration submit its own compliance plan.
72
Additionally, unanswered legal questions may further impede
imposition of probation. For example, if a court disagrees with a
corporate board of directors' decision and issues a contrary order,
and that order causes a depletion of company assets, can the court
be sued by the shareholders for breach of fiduciary duty?
73
Also, courts may be uncertain as to what general purposes are to
be achieved through probation. Theoretically, probation can dis-
able corporations through the costs of convictions and can also ef-
fectuate restitution to victims. However, the Proposed Guidelines
impose probation on a corporation as a whole and not directly on
middle-management personnel who might be the actual culprits. If
courts find that probation prompts corporations to monitor and
66. Earlyn Church, Harsh Proposals Would Ruin Many Firms, Los Angeles Daily J
6, col 4, at 5 (Mar 19, 1990) (excerpts from the written testimony of E. Church, a member of
the board of directors of the National Association of Manufacturers, presented at a hearing
before the U.S. Sentencing Commission on Feb 14, 1990).
67. Church, Los Angeles Daily J at 5, col 4 (cited in note 66).
68. 54 Fed Reg Part B at 47057 (cited in note 2).
69. Id at § 8B1.3, 47058.
70. Community restitution is a payment to a charity or broad class of citizens, as
opposed to a payment to specific victims of the defendant's offense.
71. John C. Coffee Jr., Corporate Probation Needed as Sentencing Tool, NJ L J col
4, (March 1, 1990).
72. 54 Fed Reg at § 8D1.3(d)(1), 47062 (cited in note 2).
73. Toensing, NJ L J col 4 (cited in note 61).
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take greater responsibility for middle-management activities, then
courts will be more willing to impose it. Nevertheless, it has yet to
be seen if this would occur.
Ultimately, the Proposed Guidelines represent a message not
only to the corporate community, but also to the courts. In the
modern era, both have increased responsibilities to the community.
By providing clearer sentencing standards and objectives, the Pro-
posed Guidelines continue the philosophies underlying recently
augmented corporate crime enforcement legislation. Therefore,
courts will likely impose the recommended Enhanced Conditions,
but only on carefully considered case-by-case bases.
C. Will the Proposed Guildlines Force Socially-Responsible
Companies to Pay for the Criminal Conduct of Errant
Employees?
In 1909, in New York Central & Hudson Railroad Co. v U.S.
7 4
the United States Supreme Court concluded that a corporation
may be held responsible for, and charged with, the knowledge and
purposes of its agents acting within the authority conferred on
them." More recently, in 1987 the court in U.S. v Bank of New
England, N.A.76 held that a corporation may be charged for know-
ing violations of the law, even though no single agent intended to
commit the offense or even knew of the existence of the operative
facts resulting in the violation.77
In St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. v U.S.,7 s the court held that tak-
ing great care to prevent unlawful conduct does not necessarily
constitute a defense. 79 Furthermore, a corporation does not have to
necessarily benefit from the criminal acts of its employees in order
to be criminally liable as an entity.80 In Old Monastery Co. v
74. 212 US 481 (1909). Defendant railroad company and its assistant traffic manager
were convicted for payment of rebates and entering into an unlawful agreement and ar-
rangement with its shippers. New York Central, 212 US at 489..
75. Id at 494-95.
76. 821 F2d 844, 856 (1st Cir 1987), cert denied, 108 S Ct 328 (1987). The bank was
convicted of 31 violations of the Currency Transaction Report Act. Bank of New England,
821 F2d at 846.
77. Id at 855.
78. 220 F2d 393 (1st Cir 1955) (Magruder, J., concurring). (Motor vehicle common
carrier was convicted of violating Interstate Commerce Commission regulations pertaining
to labeling during transport of dangerous substances). St. Johnsbury Trucking, 220 F2d at
393.
79. Id at 398.
80. Old Monastery Co. v U.S., 147 F2d 905 (4th Cir 1945), cert denied, 326 US 734.
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U.S.,81 the court concluded that a corporation may be culpable
even if it has been harmed by an employee's actions.82
Currently, under the federal doctrine of imputed liability, two
distinctly different types of potential corporate defendants exist:
corporations whose management plans and participates in the
criminal violations and corporations that invest heavily in compli-
ance programs, while errant employees commit violations despite
the company's policies." Since the Proposed Guidelines do not dis-
tinguish between these two types of defendants, mandatory fines
will be imposed even on a corporation that has done everything
reasonably possible to prevent a crime.8
Furthermore, as previously noted, the Proposed Guidelines re-
quire probation where any high-level management member has
been criminally convicted for a similar offense within the past five
years.85 Therefore, mere coincidence of similarity of offense be-
tween the current conviction of the corporate defendant and that
of prior management can cause the imposition of corporate
probation.
Under the Proposed Guidelines, a substantial probability exists
that some socially-responsible companies will be forced to pay for
the criminal conduct of errant employees. However, the Proposed
Guidelines do consider four mitigating factors in setting fines: (1.)
lack of knowledge of the offense by corporate management; (2) a
meaningful compliance program in effect at the time of the offense;
(3) prompt reporting of the offense or cooperation in the criminal
investigation; and (4) steps taken by the corporation to remedy the
harm, discipline individuals, and prevent a recurrence.8 6
Thus, truly socially-responsible companies may qualify under
these mitigating factors and reduce the costs in the event of trans-
gressions by such criminally-errant employees. Additionally, in
some cases juries may be hesitant to render corporate convictions
which would result in large fines on otherwise socially-responsible
companies for the criminal conduct of errant employees.
81. 147 F2d 905 (4th Cir 1945), cert denied, 326 US 734. Defendant corporation and a
number of people were convicted of conspiracy to violate the Emergency Price Control Act.
Old Monastery, 147 F2d at 905.
82. Id at 908. In fact, the acts attributed to the corporation in this case, including the
improper disbursement of $1,800 of corporate funds, were to its detriment. Id.
83. Victoria Toensing, The Sanctions Are Coming, Washington Law 28, col 1, at 30,
col 2 (Mar/Apr 1990).
84. Church, Los Angeles Daily J 6, at col 3 (cited in note 66).
85. 54 Fed Reg at § 8Dl.1(c)(1), 47062 (cited in note 2).
86. Id at § 8C2.1, 47059.
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D. Will the Proposed Guidelines Prompt Excessive Sentences
That Will Unfairly Drive Corporate Businesses Into Bankruptcy?
According to the NAM, the Proposed Guidelines are extremely
harsh, punitive, unwarranted and will place many businesses on
the threshold of insolvency. Furthermore, the NAM believes that
the recommended Enhanced Conditions,88 which place corpora-
tions on probation for failing to fully pay their monetary fines at
the time of sentencing, constitute overreaching. 9 In addition, the
NAM believes that probation will result in unusually strict super-
vision, the loss of jobs, and the eventual demise of any business
faced with probation.90 Considering the potentially large fines in
the Proposed Guidelines, the lack of set-off for restitution paid,
and the fact that probation and restitution could last from one to
five years, 91 the NAM has concluded that imposition of these fines
could dry up credit, prompt suppliers to cease deliveries, and cause
employees to feel insecure in their jobs.2 The Proposed Guidelines
require restitution, unless the court finds that the cost would be
too complicated and prolonged relative to the need for compensa-
tion to victims. 3 The only exception to the restitution requirement
is for cases where determination of the economic amount is unduly
difficult.9 4 In addition, the Proposed Guidelines envision applica-
tion of both restitution and a penalty fine, but without a set-off for
the cost of restitution.'
Nonetheless, great difficulty currently exists in properly scaling
corporate fines to deter or punish large corporations. 6 Such com-
87. Church, Los Angeles Daily J 6, at col 3 (cited in note 66). Moreover, the NAM
believes that "the business community [already] accepts responsibility for its employees'
actions, even when committed in violation of a company policy." Id.
88. As previously noted, these recommended Other Conditions include (a) requiring
the corporation to submit to audits, regular or unannounced, and to interrogation of knowl-
edgeable employees; (b) prohibiting the corporation from paying any distributions, such as
dividends, to any equity holders without prior court approval; (c) prohibiting the corpora-
tion from issuing new equity or debt securities, or obtaining additional financing outside the
ordinary course of business, without court approval; and (d) prohibiting any merger, consoli-
dation, refinancing, liquidation, bankruptcy or major transaction, without court approval. 54
Fed Reg at § 8D1.3, 47062 (cited in note 2).
89. Church, Los Angeles Daily J 6, at col 3 (cited in note 66).
90. Id.
91. 54 Fed Reg at § 8D1.2, 47062.
92. Church, Los Angeles Daily J at 6, col 4 (cited in note 66).
93. 54 Fed Reg at § 8D1.1, 47062 (cited in note 2).
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96. Richard Gruner, Probation is Best Way to Push Reforms, Los Angeles Daily J 6,
cols 1-2 (Mar 19, 1990).
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panies can often shift the economic burden of large fines to inno-
cent employees, shareholders, or customers.9 7 Furthermore, impos-
ing a $1 billion fine on a corporation of Exxon's size, for instance,
would represent a startlingly small penalty for a serious felony,
considering that Exxon's net income for the first nine months of
1989 was approximately $2.5 billion. 8
Under the Proposed Guidelines, as previously noted, defendant
corporations who have not fully paid their monetary fines or made
complete restitution by the time of sentencing face mandatory pro-
bation. However, the exact amount of the fines will not be revealed
until sentencing day. Furthermore, despite this mandatory lan-
guage, it may, for example, be physically impossible for defendant
corporations to complete clean up of environmental violations by
that date, and all victims entitled to restitution may not have been
found by that date.99
Only at the sentencing date can a corporation, which usually fol-
lows regularized internal procedures in issuing payments, initiate
the procedures to obtain the sum required."' 0 But if the fine is not
completely paid then, the court must impose probation.1 ' More-
over, the Proposed Guidelines fail to address whether a corpora-
tion that appeals its conviction must still pay. its fine on the date
of sentence."0 2
Despite these uncertainties, the Proposed Guidelines do allow
the court to defer payment of a fine if the corporate defendant is
unable to make such a payment or if requiring immediate payment
would pose an undue burden on the corporate defendant. 0 3 In ad-
dition, the Proposed Guidelines allow the court to reduce the fines
in certain instances, where it finds that the corporate defendant is
clearly unable to pay or where imposition of the fine would impair
the corporate defendant's ability to pay court-ordered
restitution. 14
If a corporate defendant has benefitted from its criminal activ-
ity, then prosecution and sentencing should punish it, deprive it of
97. Gruner, Los Angeles Daily J at col 4 (cited in note 96).
98. Id at col 1.
99. Victoria Toensing, Corporations on Probation: Sentenced to Fail, NJ L J at 7,
cols 1-2 (Feb 22, 1990).
100. Toensing, NJ L J at 7, col 2 (cited in note 99).
101. 54 Fed Reg at § 8D1.1, 47062 (cited in note 2).
102. Church, Los Angeles Daily J at 6, col 3 (cited in note 66).
103. 54 Fed Reg at § 8C3.2, 47061 (cited in note 2).
104. Id at § 8C3.3.
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its unjust advantage and provide funds for restitution to victims. 105
Under the Proposed Guidelines, Option I for assessing fines at-
tempts to achieve this goal by relating fines to the loss caused by
the corporation's offense, the gain to the corporate defendant, or
an amount from the Proposed Guidelines' fine table, 06 whichever
is greater. 107 That result would be adjusted by the aggravating or
mitigating factors specified in the Proposed Guidelines. 0 8 Option
II for assessing fines attempts to achieve this with a fine range en-
tirely based upon the offense level, with adjustments for aggravat-
ing or mitigating factors." 9
Similarly, where a corporation was created primarily for the pur-
pose of facilitating criminal activity, prosecution should conclude
with its dissolution." 0 In these cases under the Proposed Guide-
lines, the fine should be set at an amount sufficient to divest the
corporation of.its assets."'
Innocent shareholders reap the benefits of illegal, but profitable,
corporate behavior."' Furthermore, shareholders are the ultimate
source of corporate sovereignty over their executives." 3 Therefore,
it may be equitable to require even innocent shareholders to pay
for the sentence imposed." 4
It is this author's impression that the greatest danger critics per-
ceive in the Enhanced Conditions is that they could give courts the
power to destroy corporate defendants. However, until now courts
have dealt with corporate-sentencing cases without any real guide-
lines. The Proposed Guidelines represent a major step in clarifying
when and how the courts can use their broadest powers relative to
corporations: the Enhanced Conditions. In essence, they are a
much needed clarification of the parameters for use of these pow-
ers and they mitigate unbridled judicial intervention into corporate
decision-making.
i05. Id at 47057.
106. The fine tables correspond to offense levels from the sentencing guidelines for
individuals.
107. 54 Fed Reg at § 8C2.1, 47058 (cited in note 2).
108. Id at 47058-59.
109. Id at 47059-60.
110. Id at 47057.
111. Id at § 8C1.1, 47058.
112. Amitai Etzioni, Getting Down to Business on Corporate Crime, Legal Times 21,
col 3 (May 21, 1990).




E. Will the Proposed Guidelines Provide an Adequate Incentive
for Corporations to Implement Self-Policing?
According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Chairman, as
previously discussed, current fines often are too low to provide ad-
equate incentives to prompt corporations to police themselves. 11
Furthermore, the Sentencing Commission's Chairman believes that
the Proposed Guidelines provide an atmosphere of self-policing
which is so strong that employees will think twice, even though the
corporation might profit from the crime." 6 In addition, the Chair-
man believes that the Proposed Guidelines stress rewarding corpo-
rations that cooperate with prosecutors and install compliance
programs.1
7
However, considering that in the current era employee mobility
is high and loyalty to employers is low, the Chairman's prognosis
may be overly optimistic." 8 Employees seeking to compile out-
standing, short-term employment records may be totally undeter-
red by the threat of corporate sentencing facing the company for
which he works." 9 Moreover, the imposition of a large fine on a
corporation as a whole may have little effect in deterring conduct
by middle-level managers who often are the principal culprits.
20
For example, the threat of a large fine upon the Exxon Corporation
apparently did not deter the Captain of the Exxon oil tanker
Valdez in the landmark Alaskan oil spill calamity.' 2 '
Of the mitigating factors to be considered under the Proposed
Guidelines, three pertain to consideration of corporate self-polic-
ing: (1) a meaningful compliance program in place at the time of
the offense; (2) prompt reporting of the offense or cooperation in
the criminal investigation; and (3) steps taken to remedy the harm,
discipline individuals, and prevent a recurrence. 2 2 However, as
previously noted, the Proposed Guidelines do not distinguish be-
tween two distinctly different types of potential corporate defend-
ants-those whose managements plan and participate in the crimi-
115. Id.
116. Cost of Corporate Crime Should Soar, Corp Financing Week 1, col 1 (Nov 13,
1989).
117. Barbara Franklin, Corporate Penalties, Model Sentencing Guide Rewards Good
Behavior, NY L J 5, col 2 (March 29, 1990).
118. Stanley Arkin, Over-Deterrence, Part II: Sentencing Corporations, NY L J 3, 5,
col 2 (Dec 14, 1989).
119. Arkin, NY L J at 5, col 2 (cited in note 117).
120. Gruner, Los Angeles Daily J at 6, col 1-2 (cited in note 96).
121. Id.
122. 54 Fed Reg at § 8C2.1, 47058 (cited in note 2).
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nal violations and those that invest heavily in compliance
programs and yet have errant employees who commit violations
despite the company's policies. In the latter case, the Proposed
Guidelines do not provide an incentive for businesses to invest in
compliance programs.
The Proposed Guidelines, in general, through consideration of
mitigating factors, appear to provide some incentives to self-polic-
ing. Nevertheless, corporations must be prepared to deal with the
existence of disloyal or rogue employees, or middle-managers
whose decisions may get lost in the bureaucratic shuffle. In certain
cases, those employees' activities can offset the otherwise strong
incentives provided by the Proposed Guidelines for corporate self-
policing.
III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Proposed Guidelines were drafted in the belief that sentenc-
ing of a convicted corporation would assist in achieving restitution
to victims, deterring future criminal conduct, and ensuring en-
forcement of sanctions.123 The Proposed Guidelines may indeed
help with regard to these considerations. Ultimately, under the
Proposed Guidelines, corporations convicted of federal crimes
would face substantially larger fines, significant restitutionary re-
quirements, and potential intervention in corporate management
and financial operations under the proposed organizational proba-
tion provisions.
Furthermore, the Proposed Guidelines continue recent trends in
court decisions and federal legislation towards increasingly stern
sentencing for corporate criminal conduct. The Enhanced Condi-
tions may prompt corporations to monitor and take greater re-
sponsibility for middle-management activities. The Proposed
Guidelines help clarify when and how the courts can impose proba-
tion and represent their broadest powers relative to corporate de-
fendants. In addition, the Proposed Guidelines, through poten-
tially large fines and consideration of mitigating factors, provide
some incentives for corporate self-policing.
As a practical matter though, the Proposed Guidelines may still
not serve their purposes adequately. In addition to the concerns
set forth in the discussion portion of this comment, the Proposed
Guidelines fail to resolve the following practical difficulties: (1)
correlating the amount of a fine to the amount of harm done by a
123. Id at 47056.
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corporation 2' and (2) imposing only Enhanced Conditions that are
reasonably related to the nature of the corporation's offense and
necessary to achieve the court's purpose.'25
A classic example of the difficulties of both measuring and prov-
ing harm done by a criminal defendant, and imposing only proba-
tionary conditions that are reasonably related to the nature of the
offense and necessary to achieve the court's purpose, is provided
by the recent sentencing of Michael Milken, former head of Drexel
Burnham Lambert Inc.'s junk-bond department. Although that
case involved sentencing of an individual, Mr. Milken's case pro-
vides a useful analogy, in light of the following: the nature of the
crime, insider trading on Wall Street; its corporate context; that
sentencing and probation guidelines for individuals were already
effective; and that the objectives for sentencing for corporations
are identical to those for individuals.
26
In Mr. Milken's case, the U.S. Probation Office concluded that
his acknowledged crimes cost investors approximately $700,000.121
Under probation guidelines for individuals, which also consider the
losses suffered by the crime's victims, the $700,000 amount meant
Mr. Milken would likely only need to serve two years of his previ-
ously determined ten-year sentence.
28
However, the U.S. Attorney's Office which prosecuted Mr.
Milken differed sharply with the U.S. Probation Office's conclu-
sions. The U.S. Attorney's Office asserted that Mr. Milken's ac-
knowledged crimes caused approximately $5 million in losses to
victims. 29 Moreover, numerous civil suits by corporate sharehold-
ers alleged that Mr. Milken's crimes, both acknowledged and oth-
erwise, caused billions of dollars in damages to investors."'0
In Mr. Milken's case, the court tended to agree with the U.S.
Probation Office, concluding that the losses from his six acknowl-
edged crimes were less than $1 million. 31 However, Judge Kimba
Wood, who sentenced Mr. Milken, said that when she issued the
ten-year sentence she had intended that he would serve a mini-
124. See Options I and II, 54 Fed Reg at § 8C2.1, 47058 (cited in note 2).
125. 54 Fec Reg at § 8D1.3(b), 47062 (cited in note 2).
126. 54 Fed Reg at 47506 (cited in note 2). See also, 18 USC § 3353(a)(2) (1988).
127. Lambert and Geyelin, Cost of Milken's Crimes Set Relatively Low, Wall Street J
B8, col 1 (Feb 20, 1991).
128. Lambert, Wall Street J at B8, col 1 (cited in note 131).
129. Id.
130. Id, B8 at col 2.
131. Id, B8 at col 1.
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mum of 36 months before becoming eligible for parole. 132 If Judge
Wood had found that Mr. Milken's acknowledged crimes caused
harm of $1 million or more, the guidelines for individuals would
have recommended that he serve a minimum of 40 months before
becoming eligible for parole.1"'
The Proposed Guidelines ostensibly correlate the amount of a
fine with the amount of harm done by companies. Nevertheless,
they do not provide the underlying rationale for the enumerated
multipliers or adjustment factors"" to apply to a victim's losses in
calculating corporate fines. The Proposed Guidelines merely state
the multipliers or adjustment factors to consider. Moreover, the
Proposed Guidelines do not thoroughly indicate how a court is to
measure the harm done by corporations and what kind of proof is
needed. Therefore, even with the Proposed Guidelines, appropri-
ately scaling fines to deter and punish large corporations will re-
main a difficult responsibility.
Under the Proposed Guidelines, the ultimate fines will be based
primarily upon a determination of the losses caused. However, as
illustrated by Mr. Milken's case, the tasks of measuring and prov-
ing the harm done by an individual criminal defendant are not
necessarily clear or easy tasks. If a court's conclusion regarding the
losses caused is substantially inaccurate, the fine will also be
inaccurate.
There exists no reason to believe that the tasks of measuring and
proving harm are any easier with a corporate criminal defendant
than with an individual criminal defendant. Furthermore, the mul-
tiplier and adjustment factors13 5 included in the Proposed Guide-
lines can compound potential inaccuracies in fines.
With respect to the Enhanced Conditions, the Proposed Guide-
lines state that a court should only impose those conditions reason-
ably related to the nature of the corporation's offense and neces-
sary to achieve the court's purpose.1 36 Nevertheless, the only
further guidance provided by the Proposed Guidelines is in the
Commentary section, 37 which merely states that probation may be
necessary to prevent a corporate defendant from avoiding the im-
132. Id.
133. Id. See note 132.
134. Options I and 11, 54 Fed Reg at § 8C2.1, 47058 (cited in note 2), do not provide
any discussion of the underlying rationale.
135. See Options I and II (cited in note 2).
136. 54 Fed Reg at § 8D1.3(b), 47062 (cited in note 2).
137. Part D, Commentary at 46063 (cited in note 2).
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pact of a fine by passing the costs on to consumers or other
persons.
138
Obviously, the meaning of these parameters-reasonably related
to the offense and necessary to achieve the court's purpose-would
be open to much debate and the subject of many court cases. Yet,
the Proposed Guidelines do not indicate how a court is to deter-
mine if these parameters are satisfied. For example, these vagaries
will prompt questions such as: should a court consider expert testi-
mony pertaining to how a certain probation arrangement may rea-
sonably relate to the nature of a specific corporate offense? and, in
an environmental damages case, is probation necessary to achieve
a court's purpose, simply because actual future harm, if any, may
not be known for decades?
The Proposed Guidelines are not revolutionary in the greater
scheme of corporate law enforcement. Rather, the Proposed Guide-
lines are another evolutionary step in providing clearer standards
and objectives in corporate law enforcement. This author opines
that the solutions to the practical problems with the Proposed
Guidelines will be obtained only through continuation of this evo-
lutionary process.
The Proposed Guidelines should be revised to indicate, in its
Commentary sections, the underlying rationale for the enumerated
multipliers or adjustment factors to apply to victim's losses in cal-
culating corporate fines. The Proposed Guidelines should also
thoroughly indicate how a court is to measure the harm done by
corporations and what kind of proof is needed. In addition, the
Proposed Guidelines should clarify what is meant by Enhanced
Conditions that are reasonably related to the nature of a corpora-
tion's offense and necessary to achieve the court's purpose.
Before the Proposed Guidelines, virtually no standards existed
for sentencing corporations. The general standards and objectives
of the Proposed Guidelines are much needed. Just as with many
other legislative- and administrative agency-based bodies of law,
case law will need to be developed to fill in the gaps and to resolve
the problems of application. This is particularly true with the
aforesaid practical problems of the Proposed Guidelines.
Furthermore, the Proposed Guidelines set forth sentencing pa-
rameters within which both corporations and courts must work.
The Proposed Guidelines mark the beginning of the end of in-




dicial intervention in corporate affairs. Consequently, the aforesaid
practical problems are not fatal to the Proposed Guidelines. There-
fore, the author recommends that the Proposed Guidelines be en-
acted in their present form.
Ultimately, corporations and the courts must become partners in
deterring criminal activity if corporate law enforcement is to be
effective. This is also true if the Proposed Guidelines are to ade-
quately serve their purposes. If the Proposed Guidelines become
effective, it will be important to see whether they actually are a
precursor of such a partnership. For example, will the Proposed
Guidelines actually deter crimes involving the following: (1) the
health and financial consequences of corporate frauds; (2) market-
ing of dangerous products; (3) illegal dumping of hazardous wastes;
or (4) safety violations in the workplace? Furthermore, in future.
debates regarding the Proposed Guidelines, it will be interesting to
see if corporations will risk having the public think they oppose
tough punishment of white-collar crime.
The Proposed Guidelines are not perfect. However, with appro-
priate supplementation by case law and continued consideration of
corporate commentary, they can be workable. The U.S. Sentencing
Commission envisioned an evolutionary process through which the.
Proposed Guidelines would be modified and refined in light of ex-
perience. 13 9 Furthermore, the Proposed Guidelines set forth sen-
tencing standards where virtually none had existed.
The Proposed Guidelines do not add an exclamation point in the
sentence for corporate crime. Rather, they add much needed
bold-faced type.
John Levitske, Jr.
139. Id at 47057.
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